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The aim of this study was to examine the relationship between network governance 
represented by senior government officers of the audit committee (SGOAC) and audit 
fee. Knowledge distribution, economic returns, effective enforcement and compliance 
with environmental regulations can be acquired based on the social network theory. 
Hence, lower audit fees may be charged by the auditors to the company with the 
presence of a higher SGOAC as the information and knowledge gathered are based on 
their good network government connection. Analyses were conducted using data from 
690 listed companies in the Bursa Malaysia in 2014. The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regression method was applied to estimate the relationships between SGOAC and 
audit fee. The result shows that SGOAC has significant negative relationships with 
audit fee. Further analyses of the Big 4 auditor also show that lower audit fee charged 
in the number of SGOAC. It shows that it is not because of lower audit quality that 
resulted in the negative relationship between the SGOAC and audit fee. The evidence 
suggests that lower audit fees were charged by the auditor due to network governance, 
thus, network governance has a good impact on the company. Hence, the results 
provide initial evidence on the relationship between SGOAC and audit fees in business 
prospects in Malaysia. 
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Tujuan kajian ini dijalankan adalah untuk mengenalpasti hubungan antara rangkaian 
tadbir urus korporat yang diwakili oleh Pegawai Kanan Kerajaan bagi Jawatankuasa 
Audit (SGOAC) dan yuran audit. Pengedaran pengetahuan, pulangan ekonomi, 
keberkesanan penguatkuasaan dan pematuhan kepada peraturan alam sekitar boleh 
diperolehi melalui Teori Rangkaian Sosial. Oleh itu, yuran audit yang lebih rendah 
mungkin dicaj oleh juruaudit kepada syarikat dengan kehadiran SGOAC yang lebih 
ramai sebagai maklumat dan pengetahuan yang diperolehi melalui hubungan baik 
mereka dengan pihak kerajaan. Analisis yang telah dijalankan dengan menggunakan 
data daripada 690 buah syarikat yang tersenarai di Bursa Malaysia pada tahun 2014. 
Kaedah regresi Ordinary Least Square (OLS) telah digunakan untuk menganggar 
hubungan antara SGOAC dan yuran audit. Keputusan menunjukkan bahawa SGOAC 
mempunyai hubungan negatif yang signifikan dengan yuran audit. Analisis tambahan 
pada sampel juruaudit Big 4 juga menunjukkan bahawa yuran audit yang lebih rendah 
dicaj dengan bilangan SGOAC yang ramai. Hal ini menunjukkan bahawa ia bukan 
disebabkan oleh kualiti audit yang rendah yang mengakibatkan hubungan negatif 
antara SGOAC dan yuran audit. Penemuan ini mencadangkan agar yuran audit yang 
rendah akan dicaj oleh juruaudit kepada tadbir urus rangkaian, hal ini kerana ia 
memberi kesan yang baik kepada syarikat. Justeru, dapatan ini menunjukan bukti awal 
tentang hubungan antara SGOAC dan yuran audit dalam prospek perniagaan di 
Malaysia. 
 
Kata kunci: Pegawai Kanan Kerajaan bagi Jawatankuasa Audit (SGOAC), yuran 
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This chapter discussed the research interest, background, problem statement, research 
question and research objectives, significance and organisation of the study. 
1.1 Research Interest 
A distinctive feature of Malaysia includes the close bond between big company and 
government. Senior government Officers (SGO) represents the characteristics of 
network governance (Hamid, 2011), which argued implement a critical agenda that 
drives the economic growth of the nation. Their appointment as directors in many 
Malaysian public listed companies, whether in GLCs and Non-GLCs signifies those 
characteristics. Their close connection with regulators such as lawmakers or 
government influenced network governance characteristics.  
On the other hand, Malaysia is a country that different from most other countries where 
there is intertwining between multicultural ethnicities and economic interest in 
Malaysia landscape. Gomez and Jomo (1999) stated that close relationships between 
economic function and racial have shaped the capital market in Malaysia. Stenson 
(1980) found that the Chinese monopolise on the business sector, although the Malays 
dominated the political context in the country. In another point of view, the Chinese 
led Malaysian economic wealth, though the political influence is distributed 
collectively amongst ethnic groups (Abdul-Wahab, Mat Zain & James, 2011). This 
inequality of capital distribution has driven by the introduction of the New Economic 
Policy (NEP) in 1970 and government link companies later in 1980's. Earlier, from the 
time of race riot in May 1969, the government has supported certain Chinese and 
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